<!-- doc/src/sgml/user-manag.sgml -->

<chapter id="user-manag">
 <title>Database Roles</title>

 <para>
  <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> manages database access permissions
  using the concept of <firstterm>roles</firstterm>.  A role can be thought of as
  either a database user, or a group of database users, depending on how
  the role is set up.  Roles can own database objects (for example, tables
  and functions) and can assign privileges on those objects to other roles to
  control who has access to which objects.  Furthermore, it is possible
  to grant <firstterm>membership</firstterm> in a role to another role, thus
  allowing the member role to use privileges assigned to another role.
 </para>

 <para>
  The concept of roles subsumes the concepts of <quote>users</quote> and
  <quote>groups</quote>.  In <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> versions
  before 8.1, users and groups were distinct kinds of entities, but now
  there are only roles.  Any role can act as a user, a group, or both.
 </para>

 <para>
  This chapter describes how to create and manage roles.
  More information about the effects of role privileges on various
  database objects can be found in <xref linkend="ddl-priv"/>.
 </para>

 <sect1 id="database-roles">
  <title>Database Roles</title>

  <indexterm zone="database-roles">
   <primary>role</primary>
  </indexterm>

  <indexterm zone="database-roles">
   <primary>user</primary>
  </indexterm>

  <indexterm>
   <primary>CREATE ROLE</primary>
  </indexterm>

  <indexterm>
   <primary>DROP ROLE</primary>
  </indexterm>

  <para>
   Database roles are conceptually completely separate from
   operating system users. In practice it might be convenient to
   maintain a correspondence, but this is not required. Database roles
   are global across a database cluster installation (and not
   per individual database). To create a role use the <link
   linkend="sql-createrole"><command>CREATE ROLE</command></link> SQL command:
<synopsis>
CREATE ROLE <replaceable>name</replaceable>;
</synopsis>
   <replaceable>name</replaceable> follows the rules for SQL
   identifiers: either unadorned without special characters, or
   double-quoted.  (In practice, you will usually want to add additional
   options, such as <literal>LOGIN</literal>, to the command.  More details appear
   below.)  To remove an existing role, use the analogous
   <link linkend="sql-droprole"><command>DROP ROLE</command></link> command:
<synopsis>
DROP ROLE <replaceable>name</replaceable>;
</synopsis>
  </para>

  <indexterm>
   <primary>createuser</primary>
  </indexterm>

  <indexterm>
   <primary>dropuser</primary>
  </indexterm>

  <para>
   For convenience, the programs <xref linkend="app-createuser"/>
   and <xref linkend="app-dropuser"/> are provided as wrappers
   around these SQL commands that can be called from the shell command
   line:
<synopsis>
createuser <replaceable>name</replaceable>
dropuser <replaceable>name</replaceable>
</synopsis>
  </para>

  <para>
   To determine the set of existing roles, examine the <structname>pg_roles</structname>
   system catalog, for example:
<synopsis>
SELECT rolname FROM pg_roles;
</synopsis>
   or to see just those capable of logging in:
<synopsis>
SELECT rolname FROM pg_roles WHERE rolcanlogin;
</synopsis>
   The <xref linkend="app-psql"/> program's <literal>\du</literal> meta-command
   is also useful for listing the existing roles.
  </para>

  <para>
   In order to bootstrap the database system, a freshly initialized
   system always contains one predefined login-capable role. This role
   is always a <quote>superuser</quote>, and it will have
   the same name as the operating system user that initialized the
   database cluster with <command>initdb</command> unless a different name
   is specified.  This role is often named
   <literal>postgres</literal>. In order to create more roles you
   first have to connect as this initial role.
  </para>

  <para>
   Every connection to the database server is made using the name of some
   particular role, and this role determines the initial access privileges for
   commands issued in that connection.
   The role name to use for a particular database
   connection is indicated by the client that is initiating the
   connection request in an application-specific fashion. For example,
   the <command>psql</command> program uses the
   <option>-U</option> command line option to indicate the role to
   connect as.  Many applications assume the name of the current
   operating system user by default (including
   <command>createuser</command> and <command>psql</command>).  Therefore it
   is often convenient to maintain a naming correspondence between
   roles and operating system users.
  </para>

  <para>
   The set of database roles a given client connection can connect as
   is determined by the client authentication setup, as explained in
   <xref linkend="client-authentication"/>. (Thus, a client is not
   limited to connect as the role matching
   its operating system user, just as a person's login name
   need not match his or her real name.)  Since the role
   identity determines the set of privileges available to a connected
   client, it is important to carefully configure privileges when setting up
   a multiuser environment.
  </para>
 </sect1>

 <sect1 id="role-attributes">
  <title>Role Attributes</title>

   <para>
    A database role can have a number of attributes that define its
    privileges and interact with the client authentication system.

    <variablelist>
     <varlistentry>
      <term>login privilege<indexterm><primary>login privilege</primary></indexterm></term>
      <listitem>
       <para>
        Only roles that have the <literal>LOGIN</literal> attribute can be used
        as the initial role name for a database connection.  A role with
        the <literal>LOGIN</literal> attribute can be considered the same
        as a <quote>database user</quote>.  To create a role with login privilege,
        use either:
<programlisting>
CREATE ROLE <replaceable>name</replaceable> LOGIN;
CREATE USER <replaceable>name</replaceable>;
</programlisting>
        (<command>CREATE USER</command> is equivalent to <command>CREATE ROLE</command>
        except that <command>CREATE USER</command> includes <literal>LOGIN</literal> by
        default, while <command>CREATE ROLE</command> does not.)
       </para>
      </listitem>
     </varlistentry>

     <varlistentry>
      <term>superuser status<indexterm><primary>superuser</primary></indexterm></term>
      <listitem>
       <para>
        A database superuser bypasses all permission checks, except the right
        to log in.  This is a dangerous privilege and should not be used
        carelessly; it is best to do most of your work as a role that is not a
        superuser.  To create a new database superuser, use <literal>CREATE
        ROLE <replaceable>name</replaceable> SUPERUSER</literal>.  You must do
        this as a role that is already a superuser.
       </para>
      </listitem>
     </varlistentry>

     <varlistentry>
      <term>database creation<indexterm><primary>database</primary><secondary>privilege to create</secondary></indexterm></term>
      <listitem>
       <para>
        A role must be explicitly given permission to create databases
        (except for superusers, since those bypass all permission
        checks). To create such a role, use <literal>CREATE ROLE
        <replaceable>name</replaceable> CREATEDB</literal>.
       </para>
      </listitem>
     </varlistentry>

     <varlistentry>
      <term id="role-creation">role creation<indexterm><primary>role</primary><secondary>privilege to create</secondary></indexterm></term>
      <listitem>
       <para>
        A role must be explicitly given permission to create more roles
        (except for superusers, since those bypass all permission
        checks). To create such a role, use <literal>CREATE ROLE
        <replaceable>name</replaceable> CREATEROLE</literal>.
        A role with <literal>CREATEROLE</literal> privilege can alter and drop
        roles which have been granted to the <literal>CREATEROLE</literal>
        user with the <literal>ADMIN</literal> option. Such a grant occurs
        automatically when a <literal>CREATEROLE</literal> user that is not
        a superuser creates a new role, so that by default, a
        <literal>CREATEROLE</literal> user can alter and drop the roles
        which they have created.
        Altering a role includes most changes that can be made using
        <literal>ALTER ROLE</literal>, including, for example, changing
        passwords.  It also includes modifications to a role that can
        be made using the <literal>COMMENT</literal> and
        <literal>SECURITY LABEL</literal> commands.
       </para>
       <para>
        However, <literal>CREATEROLE</literal> does not convey the ability to
        create <literal>SUPERUSER</literal> roles, nor does it convey any
        power over <literal>SUPERUSER</literal> roles that already exist.
        Furthermore, <literal>CREATEROLE</literal> does not convey the power
        to create <literal>REPLICATION</literal> users, nor the ability to
        grant or revoke the <literal>REPLICATION</literal> privilege, nor the
        ability to modify the role properties of such users.  However, it does
        allow <literal>ALTER ROLE ... SET</literal> and
        <literal>ALTER ROLE ... RENAME</literal> to be used on
        <literal>REPLICATION</literal> roles, as well as the use of
        <literal>COMMENT ON ROLE</literal>,
        <literal>SECURITY LABEL ON ROLE</literal>,
        and <literal>DROP ROLE</literal>.
        Finally, <literal>CREATEROLE</literal> does not
        confer the ability to grant or revoke the <literal>BYPASSRLS</literal>
        privilege.
       </para>
      </listitem>
     </varlistentry>

     <varlistentry>
      <term>initiating replication<indexterm><primary>role</primary><secondary>privilege to initiate replication</secondary></indexterm></term>
      <listitem>
       <para>
        A role must explicitly be given permission to initiate streaming
        replication (except for superusers, since those bypass all permission
        checks). A role used for streaming replication must
        have <literal>LOGIN</literal> permission as well. To create such a role, use
        <literal>CREATE ROLE <replaceable>name</replaceable> REPLICATION
        LOGIN</literal>.
       </para>
      </listitem>
     </varlistentry>

     <varlistentry>
      <term>password<indexterm><primary>password</primary></indexterm></term>
      <listitem>
       <para>
        A password is only significant if the client authentication
        method requires the user to supply a password when connecting
        to the database. The <option>password</option> and
        <option>md5</option> authentication methods
        make use of passwords. Database passwords are separate from
        operating system passwords. Specify a password upon role
        creation with <literal>CREATE ROLE
        <replaceable>name</replaceable> PASSWORD '<replaceable>string</replaceable>'</literal>.
       </para>
      </listitem>
     </varlistentry>

     <varlistentry>
      <term>inheritance of privileges<indexterm><primary>role</primary><secondary>privilege to inherit</secondary></indexterm></term>
      <listitem>
       <para>
        A role inherits the privileges of roles it is a member of, by default.
        However, to create a role which does not inherit privileges by
        default, use <literal>CREATE ROLE <replaceable>name</replaceable>
        NOINHERIT</literal>.  Alternatively, inheritance can be overridden
        for individual grants by using <literal>WITH INHERIT TRUE</literal>
        or <literal>WITH INHERIT FALSE</literal>.
       </para>
      </listitem>
     </varlistentry>

     <varlistentry>
      <term>bypassing row-level security<indexterm><primary>role</primary><secondary>privilege to bypass</secondary></indexterm></term>
      <listitem>
       <para>
        A role must be explicitly given permission to bypass every row-level security (RLS) policy
        (except for superusers, since those bypass all permission checks).
        To create such a role, use <literal>CREATE ROLE <replaceable>name</replaceable> BYPASSRLS</literal> as a superuser.
       </para>
      </listitem>
     </varlistentry>

     <varlistentry>
      <term>connection limit<indexterm><primary>role</primary><secondary>privilege to limit connection</secondary></indexterm></term>
      <listitem>
       <para>
        Connection limit can specify how many concurrent connections a role can make.
        -1 (the default) means no limit. Specify connection limit upon role creation with
        <literal>CREATE ROLE <replaceable>name</replaceable> CONNECTION LIMIT '<replaceable>integer</replaceable>'</literal>.
       </para>
      </listitem>
     </varlistentry>
    </variablelist>

    A role's attributes can be modified after creation with
    <command>ALTER ROLE</command>.<indexterm><primary>ALTER ROLE</primary></indexterm>
    See the reference pages for the <xref linkend="sql-createrole"/>
    and <xref linkend="sql-alterrole"/> commands for details.
   </para>

  <para>
   A role can also have role-specific defaults for many of the run-time
   configuration settings described in <xref
   linkend="runtime-config"/>.  For example, if for some reason you
   want to disable index scans (hint: not a good idea) anytime you
   connect, you can use:
<programlisting>
ALTER ROLE myname SET enable_indexscan TO off;
</programlisting>
   This will save the setting (but not set it immediately).  In
   subsequent connections by this role it will appear as though
   <literal>SET enable_indexscan TO off</literal> had been executed
   just before the session started.
   You can still alter this setting during the session; it will only
   be the default. To remove a role-specific default setting, use
   <literal>ALTER ROLE <replaceable>rolename</replaceable> RESET <replaceable>varname</replaceable></literal>.
   Note that role-specific defaults attached to roles without
   <literal>LOGIN</literal> privilege are fairly useless, since they will never
   be invoked.
  </para>

  <para>
   When a non-superuser creates a role using the <literal>CREATEROLE</literal>
   privilege, the created role is automatically granted back to the creating
   user, just as if the bootstrap superuser had executed the command
   <literal>GRANT created_user TO creating_user WITH ADMIN TRUE, SET FALSE,
   INHERIT FALSE</literal>. Since a <literal>CREATEROLE</literal> user can
   only exercise special privileges with regard to an existing role if they
   have <literal>ADMIN OPTION</literal> on it, this grant is just sufficient
   to allow a <literal>CREATEROLE</literal> user to administer the roles they
   created. However, because it is created with <literal>INHERIT FALSE, SET
   FALSE</literal>, the <literal>CREATEROLE</literal> user doesn't inherit the
   privileges of the created role, nor can it access the privileges of that
   role using <literal>SET ROLE</literal>. However, since any user who has
   <literal>ADMIN OPTION</literal> on a role can grant membership in that
   role to any other user, the <literal>CREATEROLE</literal> user can gain
   access to the created role by simply granting that role back to
   themselves with the <literal>INHERIT</literal> and/or <literal>SET</literal>
   options. Thus, the fact that privileges are not inherited by default nor
   is <literal>SET ROLE</literal> granted by default is a safeguard against
   accidents, not a security feature. Also note that, because this automatic
   grant is granted by the bootstrap superuser, it cannot be removed or changed by
   the <literal>CREATEROLE</literal> user; however, any superuser could
   revoke it, modify it, and/or issue additional such grants to other
   <literal>CREATEROLE</literal> users. Whichever <literal>CREATEROLE</literal>
   users have <literal>ADMIN OPTION</literal> on a role at any given time
   can administer it.
  </para>
 </sect1>

 <sect1 id="role-membership">
  <title>Role Membership</title>

  <indexterm zone="role-membership">
   <primary>role</primary><secondary>membership in</secondary>
  </indexterm>

  <para>
   It is frequently convenient to group users together to ease
   management of privileges: that way, privileges can be granted to, or
   revoked from, a group as a whole.  In <productname>PostgreSQL</productname>
   this is done by creating a role that represents the group, and then
   granting <firstterm>membership</firstterm> in the group role to individual user
   roles.
  </para>

  <para>
   To set up a group role, first create the role:
<synopsis>
CREATE ROLE <replaceable>name</replaceable>;
</synopsis>
   Typically a role being used as a group would not have the <literal>LOGIN</literal>
   attribute, though you can set it if you wish.
  </para>

  <para>
   Once the group role exists, you can add and remove members using the
   <link linkend="sql-grant"><command>GRANT</command></link> and
   <link linkend="sql-revoke"><command>REVOKE</command></link> commands:
<synopsis>
GRANT <replaceable>group_role</replaceable> TO <replaceable>role1</replaceable>, ... ;
REVOKE <replaceable>group_role</replaceable> FROM <replaceable>role1</replaceable>, ... ;
</synopsis>
   You can grant membership to other group roles, too (since there isn't
   really any distinction between group roles and non-group roles).  The
   database will not let you set up circular membership loops.  Also,
   it is not permitted to grant membership in a role to
   <literal>PUBLIC</literal>.
  </para>

  <para>
   The members of a group role can use the privileges of the role in two
   ways.  First, member roles that have been granted membership with the
   <literal>SET</literal> option can do
   <link linkend="sql-set-role"><command>SET ROLE</command></link> to
   temporarily <quote>become</quote> the group role.  In this state, the
   database session has access to the privileges of the group role rather
   than the original login role, and any database objects created are
   considered owned by the group role, not the login role.  Second, member
   roles that have been granted membership with the
   <literal>INHERIT</literal> option automatically have use of the
   privileges of those directly or indirectly a member of, though the
   chain stops at memberships lacking the inherit option.  As an example,
   suppose we have done:
<programlisting>
CREATE ROLE joe LOGIN;
CREATE ROLE admin;
CREATE ROLE wheel;
CREATE ROLE island;
GRANT admin TO joe WITH INHERIT TRUE;
GRANT wheel TO admin WITH INHERIT FALSE;
GRANT island TO joe WITH INHERIT TRUE, SET FALSE;
</programlisting>
   Immediately after connecting as role <literal>joe</literal>, a database
   session will have use of privileges granted directly to <literal>joe</literal>
   plus any privileges granted to <literal>admin</literal> and
   <literal>island</literal>, because <literal>joe</literal>
   <quote>inherits</quote> those privileges.  However, privileges
   granted to <literal>wheel</literal> are not available, because even though
   <literal>joe</literal> is indirectly a member of <literal>wheel</literal>, the
   membership is via <literal>admin</literal> which was granted using
   <literal>WITH INHERIT FALSE</literal>. After:
<programlisting>
SET ROLE admin;
</programlisting>
   the session would have use of only those privileges granted to
   <literal>admin</literal>, and not those granted to <literal>joe</literal> or
   <literal>island</literal>.  After:
<programlisting>
SET ROLE wheel;
</programlisting>
   the session would have use of only those privileges granted to
   <literal>wheel</literal>, and not those granted to either <literal>joe</literal>
   or <literal>admin</literal>.  The original privilege state can be restored
   with any of:
<programlisting>
SET ROLE joe;
SET ROLE NONE;
RESET ROLE;
</programlisting>
  </para>

  <note>
   <para>
    The <command>SET ROLE</command> command always allows selecting any role
    that the original login role is directly or indirectly a member of,
    provided that there is a chain of membership grants each of which has
    <literal>SET TRUE</literal> (which is the default).
    Thus, in the above example, it is not necessary to become
    <literal>admin</literal> before becoming <literal>wheel</literal>.
    On the other hand, it is not possible to become <literal>island</literal>
    at all; <literal>joe</literal> can only access those privileges via
    inheritance.
   </para>
  </note>

  <note>
   <para>
    In the SQL standard, there is a clear distinction between users and roles,
    and users do not automatically inherit privileges while roles do.  This
    behavior can be obtained in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> by giving
    roles being used as SQL roles the <literal>INHERIT</literal> attribute, while
    giving roles being used as SQL users the <literal>NOINHERIT</literal> attribute.
    However, <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> defaults to giving all roles
    the <literal>INHERIT</literal> attribute, for backward compatibility with pre-8.1
    releases in which users always had use of permissions granted to groups
    they were members of.
   </para>
  </note>

  <para>
   The role attributes <literal>LOGIN</literal>, <literal>SUPERUSER</literal>,
   <literal>CREATEDB</literal>, and <literal>CREATEROLE</literal> can be thought of as
   special privileges, but they are never inherited as ordinary privileges
   on database objects are.  You must actually <command>SET ROLE</command> to a
   specific role having one of these attributes in order to make use of
   the attribute.  Continuing the above example, we might choose to
   grant <literal>CREATEDB</literal> and <literal>CREATEROLE</literal> to the
   <literal>admin</literal> role.  Then a session connecting as role <literal>joe</literal>
   would not have these privileges immediately, only after doing
   <command>SET ROLE admin</command>.
  </para>

  <para>
  </para>

  <para>
   To destroy a group role, use <link
   linkend="sql-droprole"><command>DROP ROLE</command></link>:
<synopsis>
DROP ROLE <replaceable>name</replaceable>;
</synopsis>
   Any memberships in the group role are automatically revoked (but the
   member roles are not otherwise affected).
  </para>
 </sect1>

 <sect1 id="role-removal">
  <title>Dropping Roles</title>

  <para>
   Because roles can own database objects and can hold privileges
   to access other objects, dropping a role is often not just a matter of a
   quick <link linkend="sql-droprole"><command>DROP ROLE</command></link>.  Any objects owned by the role must
   first be dropped or reassigned to other owners; and any permissions
   granted to the role must be revoked.
  </para>

  <para>
   Ownership of objects can be transferred one at a time
   using <command>ALTER</command> commands, for example:
<programlisting>
ALTER TABLE bobs_table OWNER TO alice;
</programlisting>
   Alternatively, the <link linkend="sql-reassign-owned"><command>REASSIGN OWNED</command></link> command can be
   used to reassign ownership of all objects owned by the role-to-be-dropped
   to a single other role.  Because <command>REASSIGN OWNED</command> cannot access
   objects in other databases, it is necessary to run it in each database
   that contains objects owned by the role.  (Note that the first
   such <command>REASSIGN OWNED</command> will change the ownership of any
   shared-across-databases objects, that is databases or tablespaces, that
   are owned by the role-to-be-dropped.)
  </para>

  <para>
   Once any valuable objects have been transferred to new owners, any
   remaining objects owned by the role-to-be-dropped can be dropped with
   the <link linkend="sql-drop-owned"><command>DROP OWNED</command></link> command.  Again, this command cannot
   access objects in other databases, so it is necessary to run it in each
   database that contains objects owned by the role.  Also, <command>DROP
   OWNED</command> will not drop entire databases or tablespaces, so it is
   necessary to do that manually if the role owns any databases or
   tablespaces that have not been transferred to new owners.
  </para>

  <para>
   <command>DROP OWNED</command> also takes care of removing any privileges granted
   to the target role for objects that do not belong to it.
   Because <command>REASSIGN OWNED</command> does not touch such objects, it's
   typically necessary to run both <command>REASSIGN OWNED</command>
   and <command>DROP OWNED</command> (in that order!) to fully remove the
   dependencies of a role to be dropped.
  </para>

  <para>
   In short then, the most general recipe for removing a role that has been
   used to own objects is:
  </para>
<programlisting>
REASSIGN OWNED BY doomed_role TO successor_role;
DROP OWNED BY doomed_role;
-- repeat the above commands in each database of the cluster
DROP ROLE doomed_role;
</programlisting>

  <para>
   When not all owned objects are to be transferred to the same successor
   owner, it's best to handle the exceptions manually and then perform
   the above steps to mop up.
  </para>

  <para>
   If <command>DROP ROLE</command> is attempted while dependent objects still
   remain, it will issue messages identifying which objects need to be
   reassigned or dropped.
  </para>
 </sect1>

 <sect1 id="predefined-roles">
  <title>Predefined Roles</title>

  <indexterm zone="predefined-roles">
   <primary>role</primary>
  </indexterm>

  <para>
   <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> provides a set of predefined roles
   that provide access to certain, commonly needed, privileged capabilities
   and information.  Administrators (including roles that have the
   <literal>CREATEROLE</literal> privilege) can <command>GRANT</command> these
   roles to users and/or other roles in their environment, providing those
   users with access to the specified capabilities and information.  For
   example:

<programlisting>
GRANT pg_signal_backend TO admin_user;
</programlisting>
  </para>

  <warning>
   <para>
    Care should be taken when granting these roles to ensure they are only used
    where needed and with the understanding that these roles grant access to
    privileged information.
   </para>
  </warning>

  <para>
   The predefined roles are described below.
   Note that the specific permissions for each of the roles may change in
   the future as additional capabilities are added.  Administrators
   should monitor the release notes for changes.

   <variablelist>
    <varlistentry id="predefined-role-pg-checkpoint" xreflabel="pg_checkpoint">
     <term><varname>pg_checkpoint</varname></term>
     <listitem>
      <para>
       <literal>pg_checkpoint</literal> allows executing the
       <link linkend="sql-checkpoint"><command>CHECKPOINT</command></link> command.
      </para>
     </listitem>
    </varlistentry>

    <varlistentry id="predefined-role-pg-create-subscription" xreflabel="pg_create_subscription">
     <term><varname>pg_create_subscription</varname></term>
     <listitem>
      <para>
       <literal>pg_create_subscription</literal> allows users with
       <literal>CREATE</literal> permission on the database to issue
       <link linkend="sql-createsubscription"><command>CREATE SUBSCRIPTION</command></link>.
      </para>
     </listitem>
    </varlistentry>

    <varlistentry id="predefined-role-pg-database-owner" xreflabel="pg_database_owner">
     <term><varname>pg_database_owner</varname></term>
     <listitem>
      <para>
       <literal>pg_database_owner</literal> always has exactly one implicit
       member: the current database owner.  It cannot be granted membership in
       any role, and no role can be granted membership in
       <literal>pg_database_owner</literal>.  However, like any other role, it
       can own objects and receive grants of access privileges.  Consequently,
       once <literal>pg_database_owner</literal> has rights within a template
       database, each owner of a database instantiated from that template will
       possess those rights.  Initially, this role owns the
       <literal>public</literal> schema, so each database owner governs local
       use of that schema.
      </para>
     </listitem>
    </varlistentry>

    <varlistentry id="predefined-role-pg-maintain" xreflabel="pg_maintain">
     <term><varname>pg_maintain</varname></term>
     <listitem>
      <para>
       <literal>pg_maintain</literal> allows executing
       <link linkend="sql-vacuum"><command>VACUUM</command></link>,
       <link linkend="sql-analyze"><command>ANALYZE</command></link>,
       <link linkend="sql-cluster"><command>CLUSTER</command></link>,
       <link linkend="sql-refreshmaterializedview"><command>REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW</command></link>,
       <link linkend="sql-reindex"><command>REINDEX</command></link>,
       and <link linkend="sql-lock"><command>LOCK TABLE</command></link> on all
       relations, as if having <literal>MAINTAIN</literal> rights on those
       objects.
      </para>
     </listitem>
    </varlistentry>

    <varlistentry id="predefined-role-pg-monitor" xreflabel="pg_monitor">
     <term><varname>pg_monitor</varname></term>
     <term><varname>pg_read_all_settings</varname></term>
     <term><varname>pg_read_all_stats</varname></term>
     <term><varname>pg_stat_scan_tables</varname></term>
     <listitem>
      <para>
       These roles are intended to allow administrators to easily configure a
       role for the purpose of monitoring the database server.  They grant a
       set of common privileges allowing the role to read various useful
       configuration settings, statistics, and other system information
       normally restricted to superusers.
      </para>
      <para>
       <literal>pg_monitor</literal> allows reading/executing various
       monitoring views and functions.  This role is a member of
       <literal>pg_read_all_settings</literal>,
       <literal>pg_read_all_stats</literal> and
       <literal>pg_stat_scan_tables</literal>.
      </para>
      <para>
       <literal>pg_read_all_settings</literal> allows reading all configuration
       variables, even those normally visible only to superusers.
      </para>
      <para>
       <literal>pg_read_all_stats</literal> allows reading all pg_stat_* views
       and use various statistics related extensions, even those normally
       visible only to superusers.
      </para>
      <para>
       <literal>pg_stat_scan_tables</literal> allows executing monitoring
       functions that may take <literal>ACCESS SHARE</literal> locks on tables,
       potentially for a long time (e.g., <function>pgrowlocks(text)</function>
       in the <xref linkend="pgrowlocks"/> extension).
      </para>
     </listitem>
    </varlistentry>

    <varlistentry id="predefined-role-pg-read-all-data" xreflabel="pg_read_all_data">
     <term><varname>pg_read_all_data</varname></term>
     <term><varname>pg_write_all_data</varname></term>
     <listitem>
      <para>
       <literal>pg_read_all_data</literal> allows reading all data (tables,
       views, sequences), as if having <command>SELECT</command> rights on
       those objects and <literal>USAGE</literal> rights on all schemas.  This
       role does not bypass row-level security (RLS) policies.  If RLS is being
       used, an administrator may wish to set <literal>BYPASSRLS</literal> on
       roles which this role is granted to.
      </para>
      <para>
       <literal>pg_write_all_data</literal> allows writing all data (tables,
       views, sequences), as if having <command>INSERT</command>,
       <command>UPDATE</command>, and <command>DELETE</command> rights on those
       objects and <literal>USAGE</literal> rights on all schemas.  This role
       does not bypass row-level security (RLS) policies.  If RLS is being
       used, an administrator may wish to set <literal>BYPASSRLS</literal> on
       roles which this role is granted to.
      </para>
     </listitem>
    </varlistentry>

    <varlistentry id="predefined-role-pg-read-server-files" xreflabel="pg_read_server_files">
     <term><varname>pg_read_server_files</varname></term>
     <term><varname>pg_write_server_files</varname></term>
     <term><varname>pg_execute_server_program</varname></term>
     <listitem>
      <para>
       These roles are intended to allow administrators to have trusted, but
       non-superuser, roles which are able to access files and run programs on
       the database server as the user the database runs as.  They bypass all
       database-level permission checks when accessing files directly and they
       could be used to gain superuser-level access.  Therefore, great care
       should be taken when granting these roles to users.
      </para>
      <para>
       <literal>pg_read_server_files</literal> allows reading files from any
       location the database can access on the server using
       <command>COPY</command> and other file-access functions.
      </para>
      <para>
       <literal>pg_write_server_files</literal> allows writing to files in any
       location the database can access on the server using
       <command>COPY</command> and other file-access functions.
      </para>
      <para>
       <literal>pg_execute_server_program</literal> allows executing programs
       on the database server as the user the database runs as using
       <command>COPY</command> and other functions which allow executing a
       server-side program.
      </para>
     </listitem>
    </varlistentry>

    <varlistentry id="predefined-role-pg-signal-autovacuum-worker" xreflabel="pg_signal_autovacuum_worker">
     <term><varname>pg_signal_autovacuum_worker</varname></term>
     <listitem>
      <para>
       <literal>pg_signal_autovacuum_worker</literal> allows signaling
       autovacuum workers to cancel the current table's vacuum or terminate its
       session.  See <xref linkend="functions-admin-signal"/>.
      </para>
     </listitem>
    </varlistentry>

    <varlistentry id="predefined-role-pg-signal-backend" xreflabel="pg_signal_backend">
     <term><varname>pg_signal_backend</varname></term>
     <listitem>
      <para>
       <literal>pg_signal_backend</literal> allows signaling another backend to
       cancel a query or terminate its session.  Note that this role does not
       permit signaling backends owned by a superuser.  See
       <xref linkend="functions-admin-signal"/>.
      </para>
     </listitem>
    </varlistentry>

    <varlistentry id="predefined-role-pg-use-reserved-connections" xreflabel="pg_use_reserved_connections">
     <term><varname>pg_use_reserved_connections</varname></term>
     <listitem>
      <para>
       <literal>pg_use_reserved_connections</literal> allows use of connection
       slots reserved via <xref linkend="guc-reserved-connections"/>.
      </para>
     </listitem>
    </varlistentry>
   </variablelist>
  </para>

 </sect1>

 <sect1 id="perm-functions">
  <title>Function Security</title>

  <para>
   Functions, triggers and row-level security policies allow users to insert
   code into the backend server that other users might execute
   unintentionally. Hence, these mechanisms permit users to <quote>Trojan
   horse</quote> others with relative ease. The strongest protection is tight
   control over who can define objects. Where that is infeasible, write
   queries referring only to objects having trusted owners.  Remove
   from <varname>search_path</varname> any schemas that permit untrusted users
   to create objects.
  </para>

  <para>
   Functions run inside the backend
   server process with the operating system permissions of the
   database server daemon.  If the programming language
   used for the function allows unchecked memory accesses, it is
   possible to change the server's internal data structures.
   Hence, among many other things, such functions can circumvent any
   system access controls.  Function languages that allow such access
   are considered <quote>untrusted</quote>, and
   <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> allows only superusers to
   create functions written in those languages.
  </para>
 </sect1>

</chapter>
